If the Democratic Party plans on winning another presidential election any time soon, it must stop taking its own supporters for granted.
There are a multitude of contributing factors one can point to when attempting to explain why Kamala Harris’s presidential bid ended in failure. One might choose to highlight the unique context of Biden’s last-minute dropout or Harris’s own unwillingness to separate herself from an increasingly unpopular administration — maybe you mention the economy, or immigration, or even Gaza as well.
The 2024 election cycle was unique in many ways and each of those aspects certainly played their own part in shaping November’s outcome. However, when discussing Harris’s defeat, there is one particular aspect that absolutely must be noted if the Democrats wish to learn anything from this election: the Harris campaign’s concerted effort to pander to Republican voters was an unequivocal mistake.
From hosting conservative speakers at the Democratic National Convention, to leaning on Liz and Dick Cheney as major campaign surrogates, to adopting Republican immigration policy, the Harris campaign took an unabashed right-wing turn in a clear attempt to sway moderate Republicans to their cause.
The campaign abandoned the progressive wing of their own party — which they had initially seemed to embrace when Harris chose Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz to be her running mate — in favor of moving closer to the center in a risky bid to win over moderate Republicans and the illusive “undecided” voter.
The Day’s Scoop: Your daily email briefing on all things Alabama politics.
Meanwhile, Donald Trump and J.D. Vance ran a campaign that was arguably even more extreme than the former president’s 2016 or 2020 bids. They ran on abolishing the Department of Education, mass deportations, extreme tariffs, a possible national abortion ban, and the conspiratorial villification of immigrants, trans Americans, and other minorities.
And who won? Well, it was not the party who moved towards the center. It was not the party more focused on compromising with a so-called “threat to democracy” than with their own base of supporters. It was not the party that abandoned Muslim Americans and progressives calling for a shift in foreign policy in favor of appealing to “never-Trump” Republicans.
No, Harris did not win, nor did she even make it close. In fact, Trump won even bigger than he did in 2016, coming away with the popular vote for the first time in his political career while the Democrats lost millions of votes from 2020. Democrats tried to beat Republicans at their own game by making their own policy agenda more conservative, but that did not stop Trump from convincing his supporters that Harris remained a “left-wing extremist” who was “soft on crime” despite her status as California’s former Attorney General (and his as a convicted felon). If it’s conservative policy voters want, why wouldn’t they just vote red?
What Harris’s failure demonstrates is that the modern electoral game is not about winning over some mythical independent who can be swayed to either side of the aisle by policy positions. No, the average voter is often severely uninformed about the candidates in a race, let alone their policy. To win an election in today’s polarized political environment, one does not play to the center, they play to their own base.
While Harris assumed that left-leaning Democrats would turn out for her no matter what, Trump made sure that the most conservative of his supporters were energized, motivated, and excited to vote for him. Trump did not play the middle for a single moment. Perhaps the closest he came to it was claiming that he would protect IVF access were he to win another term in office, but did he send door-knockers to Democratic households? No. Did he promise to include a Democrat in his cabinet? No. Did he soften on immigration? No, he doubled down. And he won.
Just look at Alabama where Trump won handedly in both 2016 and 2020. Despite Harris’s appeals to the center-right, Trump performed even better in the state in 2024 — winning 64.6 percent of the vote compared to the 62 percent he won in ’20 and ’16. Harris only secured 34.1 percent of the vote in Alabama — a significant, if inconsequential, decrease from Biden’s 36.6 percent in 2020.
In fact, Democratic turnout plummeted in both Republican and Democratic strongholds. Harris campaigned as if Trump was a big enough boogieman to guarantee blind support from the Democratic base, no matter how much she catered to the right. However, that miscalculation ended up leaving many Democrats uninspired and unmotivated to show up to the ballot box in states where they felt their vote would do little to change the outcome.
But shouldn’t those Democrats have voted for Harris anyways to thwart a second Trump term?
Yes, I personally believe that Trump and his policy agenda are grave enough threats to Americans and our democracy that Democrats should have voted for Harris regardless of the flaws apparent in her campaign. However, the American electorate has consistently proven itself to be highly irrational and unmotivated even when the stakes are at their highest.
Unfortunately, in America, a clear threat of impending autocracy and persecution is not enough on its own to motivate people to go out and vote. The Harris campaign failed to recognize that reality, and instead they counted on Democrats turning out to vote against Trump, rather than inspiring them to vote for Harris. That miscalculation led to too many Democrats staying home — and any never-Trump Republicans which Harris may have picked up along the way were too few and far between to make up the difference.
If the Democratic Party plans on winning another presidential election any time soon, it must stop taking its own supporters for granted and start recognizing that making appeals across the aisle is not a winning strategy. Like it or not, Harris proved that bipartisanship will not win you an election in today’s political environment.
